

BACK TO BASICS ON REDD+ SAFEGUARDS AND FINANCE

This briefing paper by the REDD+ Safeguards Working Group (R-SWG)¹ draws on:

1. Critical analyses by the R-SWG of the UNFCCC's recommendations on REDD+ Safeguards and on Safeguards Information Systems (SIS), which are elaborated in detail in previous briefing papers; and
2. Best practice case studies from the ground that R-SWG has gathered from shared learning, discussions with REDD+ negotiators and practitioners, and the experiences of our members.

The paper begins with recommendations directed to the UNFCCC and to countries, which are grounded in our analysis and informed by on-the-ground experience.

The REDD+ Safeguards are Core Minimum Requirements

The REDD+ Safeguards agreed in Cancun² aim to:

1. Improve forest governance;
2. Promote the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples and local communities and respect for their rights; and
3. Protect biodiversity to ensure ecosystem resilience and permanence of emissions reductions.
 - These are *core minimum* requirements that exist to ensure that REDD+ does no harm (i.e. to mitigate against the potential negative consequences of REDD+ on livelihoods and biodiversity) and achieves some positive benefits.
 - Effective implementation of the REDD+ Safeguards is fundamental for achieving lasting results to “slow, halt and reverse forest cover and carbon loss,” and creating the enabling environment necessary to attract and sustain long-term finance.

Key Recommendations for the UNFCCC

To ensure safeguards are addressed and respected before countries can access results-based REDD+ finance (“Phase 3”), the UNFCCC must:

- Provide policy leadership and value safeguards equally with other methodological issues
- Revisit the draft SBSTA 38 Decision (June 2013) on SIS and establish a clear and formal schedule on the timing, frequency and reporting channel for presenting summaries of information to ensure that regular reports will be provided both before and after countries have begun to access results-based finance
- Direct countries to provide reliable information in at least one report through the Safeguards Information System (SIS) demonstrating that all the safeguards have been fully addressed and respected, and that robust, participatory and transparent national frameworks for safeguards implementation, complaints and grievance redress and the provision of information through the SIS are in place, *as necessary preconditions* to Parties accessing results-based finance
- Develop additional guidance on safeguards implementation and information systems, including guidance on complaints and grievance redress mechanisms and community monitoring, that is clear, unambiguous, robust, and based on best practices and experience to date, to ensure transparency, consistency, comprehensiveness and effectiveness, and the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples and local communities

¹ The REDD+ Safeguards Working Group is a North-South coalition of civil society organizations and indigenous groups working to ensure sustainable and equitable outcomes through effective implementation of REDD+ safeguards and realization of non-carbon benefits.

² Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, paragraph 2.



Key Recommendations for Countries

To be eligible for results-based REDD+ finance (“Phase 3”), countries should:

- Have produced a report through the SIS that provides evidence that safeguards are applied and respected throughout the phases of REDD+ readiness and implementation, and that robust, participatory and transparent national frameworks are in place at all levels for safeguards implementation and the provision of information
- Have established a grievance redress mechanism through a participative process involving representatives of indigenous and forest dependent peoples and local communities at levels that are accessible, gender sensitive, transparent and culturally appropriate, and conducive to indigenous peoples and local communities
- Show in the SIS report that human rights indicators have been included in the national REDD+ framework and that obligations including full and effective participation of indigenous peoples and local communities, in particular the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) as enshrined in UNDRIP and in ILO Convention 169, have been complied with
- Embed multi-stakeholder and participatory monitoring and evaluation procedures in national REDD+ programmes and promote community monitoring in REDD+ projects, and provide results of this in the SIS report
- Conduct a multi-stakeholder review of that report at national level that will increase trust in the data and information, and ensure investor confidence
- Ensure equitable sharing of benefits through appropriate finance mechanisms that facilitate direct access for local stakeholders, especially for indigenous peoples and forest dependent communities
- Continue to demonstrate in regular SIS reports that safeguards are applied and respected throughout “Phase 3”

Obligations on REDD+ Safeguards: The UNFCCC’s failure to follow through

- Paragraphs 69, 71(d) and 72 of the Cancun Agreement³ and paragraphs 63 and 64 of the Durban Decision on finance⁴ obligate countries to implement safeguards and establish a Safeguards Information System (SIS) before results-based finance can be accessed.
- However, *the Durban Decision on SIS⁵ fails to provide adequate guidance to ensure that the SIS can be effectively implemented.* Despite numerous submissions and workshops throughout 2011, which generated a wealth of information and support, little was used. *Consequently, there are extensive methodological gaps, particularly on the characteristics of the SIS, the types of information to be provided, and how to collect and provide information.*
- As countries have begun to develop their SIS frameworks, feedback evidences the inadequacy of guidance developed in Durban. A recent study by 22 scientists on community monitoring observed: *“there is no detail on how indigenous peoples or local communities can participate in such information systems”* and that *“despite the intention of full and effective involvement of indigenous peoples and local communities, guidance on how to implement this in practice is wanting”*.⁶

³ Decision 1/CP.16.

⁴ Decision 2/CP.17.

⁵ Decision 12/CP.17.

⁶ Danielsen, F., T. Adrian, S. Brofeldt, M. van Noordwijk, M. K. Poulsen, S. Rahayu, E. Rutishauser, I. Theilade, A. Widayati, N. The An, T. Nguyen Bang, A. Budiman, M. Enghoff, A. E. Jensen, Y. Kurniawan, Q. Li, Z. Mingxu, D. Schmidt-Vogt, S. Pixa, V. Thoumtone, Z. Warta, and N. Burgess. 2013. Community monitoring for REDD+: international promises and field realities. *Ecology and Society* 18(3): 41. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05464-180341>.

- *The SBSTA draft decision prepared in Bonn (June 2013) on the timing, frequency and reporting channel to present summaries of information on how safeguards are being addressed and respected is weak, unclear and deficient, allowing countries to provide their first summary through any channel at any time after the implementation of REDD+ activities has started.*⁷

The UNFCCC can and must redeem itself at COP19 in Warsaw and agree on clear policy guidance on safeguards and results-based finance that will provide security for indigenous peoples and local communities as well as for investors.

Linkage between safeguards implementation, grievance redress, SIS, and results-based finance

In Cancun, work on REDD+ was divided between the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA).⁸ Since then, the discussion of safeguards has largely been separated from the discussion on REDD+ finance.⁹ Under SBSTA, discussion was confined to methodological issues on SIS, while negotiations under AWG-LCA explored financing options and linked to the safeguards only in a generalized sense. Thus, *although it is technically uncontested that safeguards are connected to results-based finance (RBF), discussions to date have failed to make that connection crystal clear.*

Efforts to define more clearly what “results-based finance” for REDD+ means and how it can be fully implemented began at the August 2012 AWG-LCA workshop in Bangkok. Discussions touched on safeguards implementation within a financing framework, and it was proposed that “all the safeguards must be addressed and respected” as a condition for results-based payments.¹⁰ In Durban, however, only oblique reference was made to the need to have an SIS before accessing RBF (see below).¹¹ Discussions on the linkage between safeguards and SIS on the one hand and RBF on the other have continued at the two COP Work Programme workshops in 2013¹² but with little elaboration on what that link actually entails.

R-SWG defines that linkage as follows: *Parties must provide reliable information demonstrating that the safeguards are being addressed and respected, including through the development of appropriate complaint and grievance redress mechanisms, through the SIS before Parties may access RBF.*

This is supported by the Cancun Agreement¹³ and the Durban Decision on finance¹⁴ which, when read together, amount to an obligation on countries to implement safeguards and establish an SIS before results-based finance can be accessed.

Safeguards implementation required for finance

- Cancun para 69: implementation of REDD+ activities should be carried out *in accordance with the Safeguards*¹⁵

⁷ FCCC/SBSTA/2013/L.12/Add.2. See full critique in R-SWG Briefing Paper for Results-Based Finance Workshop, 21-22 August 2013 “No Safeguards, No Results, No Finance”, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/181300996/REDD-Safeguards-Working-Group-Briefing-Paper-No-Safeguards-No-Results-No-Finance>.

⁸ Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 75 and appendix II mandated SBSTA to develop guidance relating to a “system for providing information on how the safeguards ... are being addressed and respected throughout the implementation of the [REDD+] activities” while paragraph 77 mandated the AWG-LCA to “explore financing options for the full implementation of the results-based actions”.

⁹ This contrasts with the FCPF *Guiding principles on the key methodological framework and policy guidance on a pricing approach for the Carbon Fund* and the FCPF *Carbon Fund draft Methodological Framework - September 5, 2013*, which requires that, prior to accessing the carbon fund for performance based payments and entering into the Emissions Reduction Payment Agreement (ERPA), emission reduction programmes must meet the World Bank social and environmental safeguards, promote and support the safeguards included in the UNFCCC guidance related to REDD+ and provide information on how these safeguards are addressed and respected including through application of appropriate feedback and grievance redress mechanisms.

¹⁰ Proposal by Norway. Workshop technical paper, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/tp/03.pdf>, p. 25.

¹¹ Decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 64.

¹² Examples, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/05.pdf>.

¹³ Decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 69, 71(d) and 72.

¹⁴ Decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs 63 and 64.

¹⁵ Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 69.



- Cancun para 72: when developing and implementing their national strategies or action plans, REDD+ countries are required to address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure issues, forest governance issues, gender considerations *and the safeguards*, ensuring the full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, including indigenous peoples and local communities.¹⁶
- Durban para 63: regardless of the source or type of financing, REDD+ activities should be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Cancun Agreement including the safeguards¹⁷

Since no results can occur until a REDD+ activity is implemented, and since that implementation must be in accordance with the safeguards, it follows that safeguards implementation is a necessary prerequisite to results.

Since a national complaints and grievance redress mechanism is an important part of safeguards implementation, this should be in place prior to accessing results-based finance. Under the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), additional funding¹⁸ is being provided to each country to develop a national complaints and grievance redress mechanism as a required part of their readiness before entry into an Emissions Reduction Payment Agreement (ERPA) and accessing performance (results)-based payments from the Carbon Fund.

SIS Required for Finance

- Cancun para 71 and 71(d): developing country Parties undertaking such activities are requested¹⁹ to develop a system for providing information on how the safeguards are being addressed and respected *throughout* the implementation of the activities²⁰
- Durban para 64: to obtain and receive results-based finance, these actions should be fully measured, reported and verified, and developing countries should have the elements referred to in paragraph 71 of the Cancun Agreement (i.e. including an SIS)²¹

The mandate from Cancun, reiterated in Durban, is endangered because of weak interpretation. The UNFCCC's failure to follow through on its promises in Cancun and Durban may enable access to RBF without adequate governance measures in place, including a complaints and grievance redress mechanism. This could render the UNFCCC safeguards meaningless.

Mandatory safeguards for results-based finance: A Final Opportunity at COP19?

The SBSTA 38 draft decision (Bonn, June 2013)²² is profoundly disappointing and inadequate. There is no linkage between safeguards reporting and access to results-based finance. It merely reiterates what was decided two years ago in Durban, and it allows countries to provide their first summary of information *at any time and through any reporting channel*:

- requires that Parties provide the summary of information “periodically and be included in national communications, or communication channels agreed by the [COP],”²³ and
- to “start providing the summary of information...after the start of the implementation of [REDD+] activities.”²⁴

Lack of clarity on SIS requirements creates a situation where a country might benefit from results-based payments without providing assurance that the results being paid for are sustainable and avoid

¹⁶ Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 72.

¹⁷ Decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 63.

¹⁸ http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2013/PC_Resolution_Approved_02-20-12.pdf.

¹⁹ Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 71.

²⁰ Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 71(d).

²¹ Decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 64.

²² FCCC/SBSTA/2013/L.12/Add.2.

²³ FCCC/SBSTA/2013/L.12/Add.2, paragraph 2.

²⁴ FCCC/SBSTA/2013/L.12/Add.2, paragraph 4.

social, governance and environmental harms. At the same time, vague policy on forest governance creates a disincentive for the private sector to invest in REDD+.²⁵

The R-SWG has consistently argued²⁶ that implementation of the safeguards is fundamental for achieving results. Safeguards mitigate the potential negative consequences of REDD+, help to achieve positive benefits, ensure permanence of emissions reductions and create the necessary environment to attract and sustain long-term finance by providing a framework to manage, reduce and monitor investment risk.

The Warsaw climate change conference provides Parties with what may be the final opportunity to clarify that implementing safeguards and SIS reporting are mandatory to access results-based finance.

Characteristics of safeguards implementation and reporting through SIS

To what extent should countries have complied with or implemented the safeguards to be eligible for finance?

The Durban SBSTA Decision provides only minimal guidance on the characteristics of an SIS.²⁷ The criteria for assessing the information provided therein have hardly been discussed. But despite the challenge of reaching agreement on how to assess safeguards “performance,” a signal from the UNFCCC on minimum requirements for safeguards is imperative to ensure, among other things, equitability of RBF. These requirements must be framed broadly and be flexible to accommodate national circumstances and capabilities.

The R-SWG believes that the determination of these minimum requirements must be grounded in existing experience and best practices in safeguards implementation (including complaint and grievance redress mechanisms) and SIS development. The experiences and practices summarized in the case studies presented here have generated positive results and tangible benefits at local/project and national levels. They provide guideposts for formulating minimum requirements for safeguards and SIS compliance.

²⁵ Imogen Badgery-Parker, Good governance is “critical” to engage the private sector in REDD+, *CIFOR Forests News*, 16 July 2013 (reporting on Global Symposium on REDD+ in a Green Economy, 19-20 June 2013).

²⁶ R-SWG Briefing Paper for Results-Based Finance Workshop, 21-22 August 2013, “No Safeguards, No Results, No Finance”, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/181300996/REDD-Safeguards-Working-Group-Briefing-Paper-No-Safeguards-No-Results-No-Finance>.

²⁷ Decision 12/CP.17, paragraph 2.



Case Studies

Community monitoring. The recent study by 22 scientists referred to above compares the costs of monitoring by communities and professional foresters and concludes that community monitoring may “be superior in terms of cost effectiveness because we estimate that the costs of community monitoring will decrease over time whereas the costs of forester measurements will remain similar”.²⁸ It provides practical suggestions on how to scale up community monitoring and notes that “community involvement in monitoring enhances feelings of ownership and improves governance while building local capacity”. This is borne out by extensive experience gained in Nepal.

Nepal: Engaging Communities in Forest Governance and Monitoring²⁹

Nepal’s Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) have been involved in protecting and restoring 1.3 million hectares (26%) of Nepal’s forests since they were formalized in 1993. Numbering around 18,000, they provide an example of multi-stakeholder participation and social inclusion. Members come from different ethnic and caste groups and include women. CFUGs have legal personality, earn and manage funds generated from forest use, and devise their own operational plans. They develop and enforce their own constitutions in a participatory manner, overseeing governance mechanisms that ensure transparency and accountability such as financial audits, well-being ranking, public hearings and submission of annual reports to the district forest office. They monitor the condition of the forest and biodiversity as well as their own group’s governance mechanisms and compliance with local rules, and develop their own indicators to monitor social and environmental development.

CFUGs have become catalysts for human rights education and capacity building among forest-dependent communities. The 1993 Forest Act fails to recognize traditional/customary livelihood practices of indigenous peoples. This lack of adequate safeguards is a source of great concern for the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN), an umbrella organization of 56 Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPOs) with a countrywide network of over 2700 Village Coordination Councils. NEFIN, with the support of the Federation of Community Forestry Users Nepal (FECOFUN), a network of CFUGs with 5 million members, seeks to strengthen indigenous rights in the revision of the Forest Act and Community Forestry Guidelines to ensure recognition of their traditional livelihoods for the sustainable management of forests.

NEFIN and FECOFUN, both members of the R-SWG, are active in the development of REDD+ in Nepal. NEFIN is playing a lead role at national and community levels to gain recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in line with international agreements and standards. They are collaborating in this with other stakeholders, including government agencies and civil society organizations (CSOs) such as FECOFUN. Notably, NEFIN and FECOFUN joined to develop a position paper on REDD+, which aligned CSOs and IPOs on the same platform for the recognition of safeguards in all phases of REDD+ in Nepal.

FECOFUN, meanwhile, works with partner organizations to oversee many of Nepal’s REDD+-related projects, including a Governance and Payment System and Grassroots Capacity Building Programmes. Multi-sectoral participation has been integrated into Nepal’s FCPF Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP), which refers to the necessity of “participatory forest management involving forest dependent communities, women, Dalits (‘untouchables’) and indigenous peoples.” Nepal has also incorporated the REDD+ SES into its R-PP and draft framework of the national REDD+ strategy and has developed national standards through a participatory process.

²⁸ Danielsen, F., T. Adrian, S. Brofeldt, M. van Noordwijk, M. K. Poulsen, S. Rahayu, E. Rutishauser, I. Theilade, A. Widayati, N. The An, T. Nguyen Bang, A. Budiman, M. Enghoff, A. E. Jensen, Y. Kurniawan, Q. Li, Z. Mingxu, D. Schmidt-Vogt, S. Prix, V. Thoumton, Z. Warta, and N. Burgess. 2013. Community monitoring for REDD+: international promises and field realities. *Ecology and Society* 18(3): 41. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05464-180341>.

²⁹ Sources:

Best Practices in Governance and Biodiversity Safeguards for REDD-Plus: Valuing national and field-based experiences to catalyze synergy between the UNFCCC and CBD, 2012 Policy Brief, Climate Change Commission, Swiss Confederation, Ateneo School of Government, Helvetas Swiss Incorporation.

Persistence and Change: Review of 30 years of community forestry in Nepal, 2013, The Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation, The Government of Nepal.

Study on REDD Plus Piloting in Nepal, 2011, Government of Nepal Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation REDD- Forestry and Climate Change Cell. http://pdf.wri.org/rpp_country_table_nepal.pdf

<http://www.irinnews.org/report/96394/nepal-community-forest-value-untapped>

Multi-stakeholder review. Inclusivity and transparency in creating social and environmental criteria and standards have produced potent tools which, in the case of Brazil, illuminate the social and environmental safeguards that should be in place when implementing REDD+ in the Amazon. The criteria and standards produced by the REDD+ SES initiative, meanwhile, provide a potential model for developing SIS.

Brazil Shows Value of Diversity in Establishing Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria³⁰

Brazil's Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria (SEPC) for REDD+ were conceptualized amid growing interest for REDD+ in 2009, in the context of addressing deforestation in the Amazon.

A steering committee composed of rural producers, environmental NGOs, indigenous peoples, social movement groups, smallholders, research bodies and representatives from business created the first draft of the SEPC, which was open to public consultation for 5 months, both online and through meetings among indigenous peoples and smallholders. The process was led by civil society, keeping the government informed of developments.

The final SEPC stipulate legal compliance with labor rights, recognition of Brazil's environmental laws, respect for related international agreements, free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples (FPIC), and equitable benefit-sharing. It also addresses economic sustainability of REDD+ projects without sacrificing environmental conservation, and mandates improvement of governance.

This bottom-up approach resulted in standards that reflect principles embedded in international criteria while remaining faithful to the ideas and views of multiple stakeholders. The Brazilian National Bank, which manages the Amazon Fund for performance-based REDD+ payments, now uses the SEPC as a reference for Economic and Social Development.

The REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards (SES) initiative - A Model for SIS?

The REDD+ SES is a voluntary initiative providing a comprehensive set of standards to assess the social, environmental and governance performance of REDD+ programmes at national and sub-national levels. The standards and guidelines for their use have been elaborated in an inclusive and participatory way. They are not static, but have evolved through learning in countries using the REDD+ SES and broad consultation involving public comment periods.³¹

Importantly, the guidelines incorporate national multi-stakeholder review of performance assessment reports, which in countries adopting the REDD+ SES would provide the basis for summaries of information through the SIS. The R-SWG considers such a review vital to ensure reliability of information and to provide assurance of compliance with safeguards. It also identifies areas for improvement, avoiding harm and enhancing benefits. Countries that adopt the REDD+ SES approach as a basis for their SIS will likely be perceived as lower risk, giving them an advantage in attracting long-term investment.

³⁰ Sources:

Talia Manceira, Bonfante Maurício, Voivodic Luis, Meneses Filho Developing Social and Environmental Safeguards for REDD+: A guide for a bottom-up approach, 2010.

REDD+ Social Safeguards and Standards Review, 2012, Forest Carbon, Markets and Communities (FCMC) Programme.

Bernadinus Steni, Anggalia Putri, Jean La Rose, Joëlle Mukungu, Pasang Dolma Sherpa, REDD Observatory, Brazil, Siri Damman, Marina Campos, National REDD+ processes: a compilation of case studies to inform negotiations at COP 18.

³¹ Sources: Factsheet: REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards: Supporting Countries to Develop Safeguards Information Systems, November 2012. http://www.redd-standards.org/index.php?option=com_eywafm&task=cat_view&gid=42&Itemid=185

http://www.redd-standards.org/index.php?option=com_eywafm&task=cat_view&gid=45&Itemid=185 for version 2 of the REDD+ SES and

<http://www.redd-standards.org/files/pdf/redd-docs/Guidelines/-REDD%20SES%20Guidelines%20Draft%20V2%20revised%2008-20-12.pdf> for version 2 of the draft Guidelines.



Human rights approach. The Cancun Agreement explicitly recognizes that UNFCCC Parties are obligated to fully respect human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples, in all climate change-related decisions and actions. Thus REDD+ finance must be framed by a human rights-based approach and access to results-based finance should be dependent on countries putting in place the elements necessary to achieve this.

Why Villages are Vital in REDD+³²

The community-based REDD+ project shaped by the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) and the Community Forest Conservation Network of Tanzania (MJUMITA) illustrates that Participatory Forest Management (PFM), sustainable land use, and FPIC form the bedrock of equitable benefit-sharing and social and economic empowerment.

The project, “Making REDD+ Work for Communities and Forest Conservation in Tanzania”, places a high premium on transparency, accountability and inclusivity. It uses a pro-poor approach and began with a clear application of measures to reduce risks and negative impacts on biodiversity, indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities by conducting a participatory Social Impact Assessment among the sites in the Morogoro and Lindi regions, and securing FPIC in 36 villages located in two biodiversity hotspots.

The villagers are active participants in every step of the process, in accordance with the country’s PFM, which has helped in recognizing and developing rules on land use rights and paved the way for adoption of community bylaws and forest management plans by the village council and assembly.

Individuals are given direct access to finance through a benefit sharing scheme. The by-laws developed by villagers provide a basis for trial payments, a process which has succeeded in making village leaders more accountable. The \$5-million project, funded by the Norwegian government, aims to generate certified carbon credits worth 110,000 tons that would benefit poor rural communities.

Public support and governance reform. When implementing REDD+ projects, strong support from the government can spell the difference between sustainable and ephemeral success. National and local leadership are key to infusing REDD+ projects with the legal and financial tools to invigorate proactive participation from local communities.

Political will is a fundamental driver of reform. It fosters robust strategies and creative solutions as well as upholds tried-and-tested principles of good governance such as transparency and accountability - components that are indispensable in preparing for and implementing REDD+ projects.

³² Sources:

Working Together for Learning and Action: Shared Experiences of the Tanzania REDD+ Pilot Projects.

Official ‘making REDD work for communities and forest conservation in Tanzania’ project website: <http://www.tfcg.org/makingreddWork.html>

Progress summary: making REDD work for communities and forest conservation in Tanzania: summary of progress between September 2010 to February 2011, TFCG/MJUMITA, 2011.

TFCG / MJUMITA REDD project leaflet, TFCG, 2009: <http://www.tfcg.org/pdf/TFcG%20mJUmiTa%20reDD%20project%20leaflet.pdf>

Benefit sharing to make REDD+ work for communities and forest conservation in Tanzania: The community carbon enterprise (CCE) model (Richard Kimbowa, David Mmwayafu (UCSD) and Rahima Njaidi (MJUMITA)

Building a “Village Company” to improve community based forest management in the context of REDD

TFCG and MJUMITA launch community REDD project (The ARC Journal, Tanzania Forest Conservation Group)

You Plan, We Pay: Incentives for Community Decision-making in Ecuador's Socio Bosque³³

Under Ecuador's Socio Bosque ("Forest Partners Programme"), communal and private landowners are paid annually for entering into conservation agreements with the Ministry of Environment. The programme provides incentives to landowners and indigenous communities with sound investment plans that detail how compensation for protecting their forests will be used - identifying priorities and shaping their own approach to improving access to education, health care and other social services.

This voluntary programme encourages proactive decision-making among participants, who are directly paid for each hectare of native forest conserved. The programme aims to protect four million hectares of forest and enhance environmental services through biodiversity refuges, hydrological regulation and carbon storage, while simultaneously improving the lives of one million people in impoverished areas.

As of 2012, over 90 conservation agreements had been signed. The government is the primary funder but other sources, including environmental taxes and REDD+ payments, are under consideration. More than \$14 million in investments has been funneled into Socio Bosque, benefiting more than 90,000 people.

Socio Bosque is an integral part of Ecuador's national strategy for REDD+, strengthening the role of forest-dependent communities and the accountability and transparency of REDD+ initiatives. It highlights the importance of designing a programme that captures and drives social, economic and environmental benefits.

Changing Cross River State, Good Governance Style³⁴

The leadership of Senator Liyel Imoke, Governor of Cross River State in Nigeria - coupled with dynamic collaboration between government agencies, led by the Cross River State Forestry Commission (CRSFC), and civil society organizations in the Cross River State, in particular, and the country at large - shows how political will and conscientious governance can provide social and environmental benefits, improving land tenure, community participation and biodiversity conservation.

Cross River State is home to 50% of Nigeria's forests. It is a biodiversity hub, with 75% of the country's endangered tree species and 22 species of primates. Rural communities depend on the forests for their food, medicine and livelihood. To address deforestation, Imoke enacted a 2-year logging ban in 2009, which has since been extended for another two years, and created an Anti-deforestation Task Force in 2011. CRSFC, whose members include a Chairman with executive powers, four commissioners (with various portfolios), and a Permanent Secretary, spearheaded a tree-planting campaign, established a mangrove reserve, and has pushed for the inclusion of mangroves as "forests" in the UNFCCC.

In 2010, Imoke signed the Forestry Commission Law, authorizing the Commission to regulate government projects that may impact forest resources and to coordinate with national and international bodies in protecting wildlife. It also recognizes community bylaws developed and enforced by forest management committees (FMCs), formed by communities or villages to oversee the responsible harvest and sale of timber products.

Imoke also oversaw the modernization of the land management system and introduced the Cross River Geographical Information Agency (CRGIA) in 2009. The new system strengthens land tenure by streamlining processes to secure and revalidate Certificates of Occupancy (C-of-Os) - in which local government authorities grant land use rights - by updating data on land ownership and cadastral information. Positive feedback on the CRGIA states that "Both the applicants and customers trust the transparency of the system and largely depend on the information coming out of it." Imoke and CRSFC are also exploring the potential for payments from ecosystem services for forests.

³³ Sources:

REDD and Indigenous Peoples: The Programme Socio Bosque by the Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment in the Context of the Debates around Development and Climate Change, 2011, Markus Seiwald.

Private conservation agreements support climate action: Ecuador's Socio Bosque programme (2012, Inside Stories on Climate Compatible Development, Climate and Development Knowledge Network).

The Road Ahead for REDD+ in Ecuador (Daniela Carrion, http://www.un-redd.org/Newsletter17/REDD_in_Ecuador/tabid/54001/Default.aspx).

Bridging the gap between forest conservation and poverty alleviation

http://www.conservation.org/where/south_america/ecuador/Pages/projects.aspx

³⁴ Sources:

<https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/media-resources/the-cross-river-revival/>

<http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/j1533e/J1533E29.htm>

Streamlining Land Administration and Governance In Cross River State, Nigeria, Nigel, Chiemeka, Bassey Ika.

GCF Database: CROSS RIVER STATE, NIGERIA Version 4: November 5, 2010

Nigerian Governor Imoke Receives Special Achievement Award From Thomson Reuters, press release,

<http://allafrica.com/stories/201308210724.html>

Peter Jenkins installed as Chairman of Cross River State Anti-deforestation Task Force

Land Reforms in the Nigerian State of Cross River, Paul Ndiho, <http://paulndiho.com/2013/09/18/land-reforms-in-the-nigerian-state-of-cross-river/>

A Preliminary Assessment of the Context for REDD in Nigeria, Macarthy Oyebo, Francis Bisong and Tunde Morakiny, The Federal Ministry of Environment, the Cross River State's Forestry Commission and UNDP.



REDD+ SAFEGUARDS WORKING GROUP



ATENEO DE MANILA
UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT



http://www.humo.or.id



Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) | Asian Indigenous Women's Network (AIWN)
 AMAN (Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago) | Ateneo School of Government (ASoG)
 Bianca Jagger Human Rights Foundation (BJHRF) | Birdlife International | Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)
 Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental (CEMDA) | Climate Justice Programme (CJP) | David Shepherd Wildlife Foundation (DSWF)
 Environmental Investigation Agency US | Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN-Nepal) | Forests of the World
 Greenpeace | HuMA (Association for Community and Ecology-Based Law Reform)
 Institute for Law and Environmental Governance (ILEG) | Indigenous Livelihoods Enhancement Partners (ILEPA)
 The Orangutan Project (TOP) | Naturvernforbundet (Friends of the Earth Norway)
 Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) | NGO Coalition for Environment (NGOCE) | Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN)
 Tebtebba (Indigenous Peoples' International Centre for Policy Research and Education) | Wetlands International

Please contact info@reddplussafeguards.com for questions, comments and suggestions.
 Visit our new website at <http://reddplussafeguards.com>. Follow us on twitter @reddsafeguards.